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LUIS V. UNITED STATES: ASSET
FORFEITURE BUTTS HEADS WITH
THE SIXTH AMENDMENT
JORDAN GLASSBERG*
INTRODUCTION
Asset forfeiture, or the government’s seizure of property
connected to illegal activities, has vastly increased in recent years,
1
both in scope and in the public’s consciousness. Criminal forfeiture,
as opposed to civil, “allows the government to take property from
defendants when they are convicted for particular substantive
2
3
crimes.” Though forfeiture has existed since early civilizations,
4
historically it has been disfavored in the United States. The federal
government only began asserting forfeiture powers in 1970 as part of
5
an effort to combat serious drug crimes.
The debate over asset forfeiture can be heated: proponents assert
its usefulness just as loundly as critics declare its harms. The Justice
Department emphasizes that forfeiture is a proper tool of law
enforcement because it “removes the tools of crime from criminal
organizations, deprives wrongdoers of the proceeds of crimes,
* J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law, Class of 2017.
1. See generally John Burnett, Seized Drug Assets Pad Police Budgets, NATIONAL
PUBLIC RADIO (July 15, 2008), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=91490480;
Last Week Tonight with John Oliver: Civil Forfeiture (HBO television broadcast Oct. 5, 2014),
https://youtu.be/3kEpZWGgJks.
2. SARAH N. WELLING, ET AL., FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND RELATED ACTIONS:
CRIMES, FORFEITURE, THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT AND RICO 560 (1998).
3. See Brief Amicus Curiae of United States Justice Foundation et. al. in Support of
Petitioner at 18, Luis v. United States, No. 14-419 (U.S. Aug. 25, 2015) (discussing asset
forfeiture in ancient Asia and in early English common law); see also Michael Todd King, Note,
Expanding the Courts’ Power to Preserve Forfeitable Assets: The Pretrial Restraint of Substitute
Assets Under RICO and CCE, 29 GA. L. REV. 245, 247 (1994) (tracing forfeiture back to ancient
Western civilizations).
4. See, e.g., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 682–86 (1974)
(discussing the history of American forfeiture).
5. See Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–68
(2012); see generally Welling, supra note 2, at 562 (describing the beginnings of federal asset
forfeiture).
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recovers property that may be used to compensate victims, and deters
6
crime.” On the other hand, forfeiture has been criticized for
extracting guilty pleas from defendants fearful of losing their
7
property, and as a method used to pad the government’s own
8
budget.
Adding to the debate is the implementation of pretrial restraint of
assets, which is the government’s ability to freeze, prior to trial, any
assets the government believes will ultimately be found forfeitable.
9
Such pretrial restraint is authorized under federal law. The exercise
of this government power potentially implicates the constitutional
rights of defendants wishing to utilize those restrained assets to hire
an attorney for an impending criminal trial. Specifically, the Sixth
Amendment provides that, “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
10
defence.” This right has been interpreted to require that a defendant
11
be able to secure counsel of his own choice, a choice that has been
12
described as “the root meaning of the constitutional guarantee.”
The Supreme Court has already determined that a defendant does
not have the right to pay counsel with tainted assets that are directly
13
14
traceable to a crime. But Luis v. United States, a case recently taken
by the Supreme Court, provides a new wrinkle to this problem. In
Luis, the government was unable to locate the defendant’s tainted
assets, and so sought to restrain other assets of the defendant’s, so-

6. RICHARD WEBER, UNITED STATES DEP’T OF JUSTICE EXEC. OFFICE FOR UNITED
STATES ATTORNEYS, Introduction, 55 UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ BULL. 6, Nov. 2007, at 1;
see also Kaley v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1090, 1094 (2014) (“Forfeitures help to ensure that
crime does not pay . . . .”); Gerald E. McDowell, Letter to the Editor, Why Prosecutors Choose
Civil Forfeiture, N.Y. TIMES (July 5, 1996), http://www.nytimes.com/1996/07/05/opinion/l-whyprosecutors-choose-civil-forfeiture-063487.html (providing a Department of Justice perspective
on why forfeiture is pursued).
7. See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of United States Justice Foundation, et al. in Support of
Petitioner at 24, Luis v. United States, No. 14-419 (U.S. Nov. 26, 2014) [hereinafter Brief
Amicus Curiae of United States Justice Foundation].
8. See Stewart Powell, U.S. Asset Forfeitures Skyrocket, TIMES UNION (New York City)
(May 25, 2013), http://www.timesunion.com/news/article/U-S-asset-forfeitures-skyrocket4549149.php (describing asset forfeiture as “a slush fund for the federal government” (quoting
Senator Charles Grassley)).
9. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 1345 (2012).
10. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
11. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932).
12. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 147–48 (2006) (citation omitted).
13. See Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 618 (1989) discussed
infra Part II.
14. Luis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2798 (June 8, 2015).
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15

called “substitute assets,” under 18 U.S.C. § 1345. Thus, Luis presents
the novel of whether the government may restrain a defendant’s
substitute assets when any tainted assets cannot be located, even if
doing so deprives the defendant of the ability to hire an attorney of
16
the defendant’s own choosing.
This Commentary will first explore the factual and legal
background that will influence the Court’s analysis, as well as the
arguments presented by each side. Though many amici briefs have
been filed asserting the consequences of allowing restraint of
substitute assets, the Court should still allow the government this
power. Although courts continue to debate the statutory
interpretation question of whether the language in federal forfeiture
17
statutes permits pretrial restraining of substitute assets, this
Commentary will concentrate on the constitutional and policy-based
questions that the Court will face.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Sila Luis, an owner of a health-care business, was indicted on
October 2, 2012 and charged with “paying and conspiring to pay
illegal kickbacks for patient referrals, and conspiring to defraud
18
Medicare by billing for unnecessary or underperformed services.”
The indictment sought forfeiture of $45 million in Medicare
reimbursements, the same amount that Luis’s companies are alleged
19
to have fraudulently received. Luis’s assets were restrained under 18
20
U.S.C. § 982, a statute that orders forfeiture for Medicare fraud.
Section 982 states that any forfeiture it authorizes “shall be governed
21
by the provisions of . . . 21 U.S.C. § 853.” Section 853, in turn, allows
22
for forfeiture of substitute property. This means that if any tainted

15. Brief for the United States at 6–8, Luis v. United States, No. 14-419 (U.S. Sept. 30,
2015) [hereinafter Brief for the United States].
16. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at ii, Luis v. United States, No. 14-419 (U.S. Oct. 7,
2014) [hereinafter Petition for Writ of Certiorari].
17. Compare United States v. Gotti, 155 F.3d 144, 147 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that the
RICO statute does not authorize pretrial restraint of substitute assets) and United States v.
Ripinsky, 20 F.3d 359, 360 (9th Cir. 1994) (same) with United States v. Patel, 949 F. Supp. 2d
642, 654 (W.D. Va. 2013) (holding that § 982 covers substitute assets).
18. Brief for the Petitioner at 5, Luis v. United States, No. 14-419 (U.S. Aug. 18, 2015)
[hereinafter Brief for the Petitioner].
19. Id.
20. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 982(a) (2012).
21. Id. § 982(b)(1).
22. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, 21 U.S.C. § 853(p)(2) (2012).
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assets cannot be located or have been transferred, “the court shall
order the forfeiture of any other property of the defendant, up to the
23
value of [the tainted] property.” Based on information that Luis’s
fraudulently-obtained proceeds had already been transferred to
various properties and bank accounts, the government pursued
24
forfeiture of Luis’s substitute assets.
The government simultaneously brought an action to temporarily
25
restrain the same substitute assets under 18 U.S.C. § 1345. The
district court entered a temporary restraining order on October 3,
26
2012. Luis argued that restraining her personal untainted assets
prevented her from mounting a defense, as her case would require
reviewing “records of . . . more than 1,900 Medicare patients and 1,000
other patients,” and thereby violated her Fifth and Sixth Amendment
27
rights.
The government subsequently sought to convert its restraining
28
order into a preliminary injunction. A hearing was held on February
6, 2013, at which an FBI agent testified as to the information leading
to Luis’s charges and provided declarations that Luis was transferring
money gained from her fraudulent activities to shell corporations,
29
luxury items, real estate, and travel. The parties subsequently
stipulated that some of the accounts and real estate subject to the
restraining order contained assets not directly connected to the
30
indictment.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Although the right to choose one’s counsel has been held to be
31
the basis of the Sixth Amendment, this right is circumscribed in
32
numerous ways. One limit is that “a defendant may not insist on

23. Id.
24. Brief for the United States, supra note 15, at 6–8.
25. Id. at 6; see also Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 1345(a)(2)
(2012) (allowing for a restraining order from using or disposing of property derived from certain
federal crimes, including healthcare offenses).
26. Brief for the United States in Opposition at 6, Luis v. United States, No. 14-419 (U.S.
Mar. 30, 2015) [hereinafter Brief for the United States in Opposition].
27. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 18, at 7.
28. Id. at 6.
29. United States v. Luis, 966 F. Supp. 2d 1321, 1326–27 (S.D. Fla. 2013) aff’d per curiam,
564 F. App’x 493 (11th Cir. 2014) cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 2798 (June 8, 2015).
30. Brief for the United States, supra note 15, at 10.
31. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 147–48 (2006) (citation omitted).
32. See Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988).
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33

representation by an attorney he cannot afford.” In 1989, the
Supreme Court confronted two cases questioning whether the federal
government could restrain assets that were directly attributed to a
crime even if the defendant wanted to use those assets to pay for a
34
private attorney. Decided on the same day, United States v. Monsanto
and Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States together stand for
the proposition that “a defendant has no Sixth Amendment right to
spend another person’s money for services rendered by an attorney,
even if those funds are the only way that that defendant will be able to
35
retain the attorney of his choice.” Monsanto found the statutory
language of 21 U.S.C. § 853 to be unambiguous: there was no
exception providing for assets that may be neecessary to pay an
36
attorney.
37
Caplin considered the constitutional dimensions of this question,
and rejected “any notion of a constitutional right to use the proceeds
38
of crime to finance an expensive defense.” The Court concluded that
a pretrial restraint of tainted assets was legitimate given the “strong
governmental interest in obtaining full recovery of the assets . . . [and]
to lessen the economic power of organized crime and drug
39
enterprises.” The Court asserted that pursuing forfeiture also
“supports law-enforcement efforts in a variety of important and
40
useful ways.” Although the defendant desired to hire private counsel,
the Court ruled that he had adequate alternatives such as finding an
attorney willing to represent him for a lower price or relying on
41
representation by appointed counsel. Caplin, therefore, found the
42
burden placed on a defendant to be only limited, and that the
43
governmental interests overrode this limited burden. The Court
likewise dismissed the argument that this practice could lead to

33. Id.
34. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989); United States v.
Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600 (1989).
35. Caplin, 491 U.S. at 626 (emphasis added).
36. Monsanto, 491 U.S. at 606.
37. Caplin, 491 U.S. at 623.
38. Id. at 630 (citation omitted); see also United States v. Patel, 949 F. Supp. 2d 642, 656–
57 (W.D. Va. 2013) (summarizing Caplin’s rationale).
39. Caplin, 491 U.S. at 625; see also Monsanto, 491 U.S. at 614 (“In enacting § 853,
Congress decided to give force to the old adage that ‘crime does not pay.’”).
40. Caplin, 491 U.S. at 629.
41. Id. at 624–25.
42. Id. at 625.
43. See id. at 631.
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44

prosecutorial abuse. The Court stated that there exists no claim
when a prosecutorial tool merely could lead to abuse, because
45
“[e]very criminal law carries with it the potential for abuse.”
46
Four Justices provided a joint dissent to Monsanto and Caplin.
Written by Justice Blackmun, the dissent expressed concern that the
majority trivialized the burden that forfeiture placed on a defendant
and enforced a system in which prosecutors could “beggar those it
47
prosecutes in order to disable their defense at trial.” The dissent also
reweighed the interests of both parties, concluding that the
government’s interest in forfeiture was only hypothetical until the end
48
of trial while the defendant’s interest was real and immediate. Not
permitting a defendant to hire his own counsel threatened “the trust
between attorney and client that is necessary for the attorney to be a
49
truly effective advocate,” and the “truly equal and adversarial
50
presentation of the case.” Instead, the dissent argued that section 853
51
violated the Sixth Amendment.
Since Caplin, some circuit courts have confronted the specific
issue in Luis, i.e., whether substitute assets may also be restrained
pretrial. The Second, Third, Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have
concluded that pretrial restraint of substitute assets is not allowed,
52
primarily based on the language of the statute. The courts that have
held that it should be allowed, most notably the Fourth Circuit and
the Eastern District of Wisconsin, have based their determination
53
mainly on the rationale behind forfeiture. Relying largely on Caplin,
In re Assets of Billman explained that substitute assets may be

44. Id. at 634.
45. Id. (quoting In re Forfeiture Hearing as to Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 837 F.2d
637, 648 (4th Cir. 1988)).
46. Id. at 635–56 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 635.
48. See id. at 645–49, 653 (discussing interests for both the federal government and the
defendants).
49. Id. at 645.
50. Id. at 648.
51. See id. at 651 (“[A]ttorney’s-fee forfeiture substantially undermines every interest
served by the Sixth Amendment right to chosen counsel . . . .”).
52. United States v. Gotti, 155 F.3d 144, 147 (2d Cir. 1998); United States v. Riley, 78 F.3d
367, 370–71 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Ripinsky, 20 F.3d 359, 362–63 (9th Cir. 1994); In re
Assets of Martin, 1 F.3d 1351, 1359 (3d Cir. 1993); United States v. Floyd, 992 F.2d 498, 502 (5th
Cir. 1993).
53. In re Assets of Billman, 915 F.2d 916, 917 (4th Cir. 1990); United States v. Schmitz, 153
F.R.D. 136, 141 (E.D. Wis. 1994); see also Welling, supra note 2, at 610 (“These courts cite the
purpose of forfeiture law as a whole to prevent dissipation of assets . . . .”).
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untainted, in that they are not directly attributed to a crime, but they
are still forfeitable, as they are expressly allowed to be forfeited by
54
statute. Because Caplin already affirmed that the government’s
pretrial seizure of assets does not disturb the Sixth Amendment, the
Billman court stated that there was no distinction between tainted
55
56
and substitute assets. It held that both may be similarly restrained.
III. HOLDING
The District Court for the Southern District of Florida converted
the government’s temporary restraining order into a preliminary
57
injunction based on a finding of probable cause that health care
58
offenses had been committed and that the associated assets had been
59
transferred or destroyed.
The court rejected Luis’s Sixth
Amendment argument and held that the language of section 1345
allows that “when some of the assets that were obtained as a result of
fraud cannot be located, a person’s substitute, untainted assets may be
60
restrained instead.” The court specifically noted that the Sixth
61
Amendment right to choose counsel is limited. It then expanded on
62
an analogy previously described in United States v. Bissell : if a bank
robber is prohibited from paying an attorney with $100,000 that he
stole, would it make sense for him to be allowed to dispose of those
assets, and then use another $100,000 he happened to have lying
63
around instead? The court determined that “the reasonable answer
is no. The bank has the right to have those substitute, untainted assets
64
kept available for return as well.” Just as with any defendant whose

54. Billman, 915 F.2d at 922; see also United States v. Wingerter, 369 F. Supp. 2d 799, 810
(E.D. Va. 2005) (“[T]he key distinction for determining whether pretrial restraint of property
violates a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right is not whether the property is tainted or
untainted, but rather whether it is forfeitable or nonforfeitable.”).
55. See Billman, 915 F.2d at 922 (“The funds in issue are not nonforfeitable assets. They
are Billman’s substitute assets, which [are] subject[] to forfeiture.”).
56. Id.
57. United States v. Luis, 966 F. Supp. 2d 1321, 1325 (S.D. Fla. 2013).
58. Id. at 1327.
59. Id. at 1327–28.
60. Id. at 1325 (citation omitted).
61. Id. at 1333–34.
62. United States v. Bissel, 866 F.2d 1343, 1351 (11th Cir. 1989) (quoting In re Forfeiture
Hearing As to Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 837 F.2d 637, 645 (4th Cir. 1988)).
63. Luis, 966 F. Supp. 2d at 1334 (quoting Bissell, 866 F.2d at 1351).
64. Id.
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tainted assets had been restrained, the Court held that Luis would
65
have to settle for appointed counsel.
The Eleventh Circuit issued a per curiam opinion affirming the
66
district court. The circuit court considered Luis’s Sixth Amendment
arguments to be foreclosed by cases like United States v. Monsanto
67
and Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States. Therefore, the
court held that section 1345 “includes the authority to restrain
‘property of equivalent value’ to that actually traceable to the alleged
68
fraud.”
IV. ARGUMENTS
A. Luis’s Arguments
Luis’s arguments focus on the harm that would come to criminal
defendants should their substitute assets be restrained pretrial. The
United States’ historical disdain for forfeiture also plays heavily in
69
Luis’s arguments. Luis first contends that Monsanto and Caplin are
70
not dispositive. She argues that those cases only decided the
question of what may be done to tainted assets; therefore, the Court is
71
presented with an entirely new question regarding substitute assets.
This distinction is critical for Luis’s success.
Luis argues that the integrity of the criminal justice system relies
72
on a defendant being able to choose and pay for his or her attorney.
She states that “[d]isplacing a defendant’s chosen advocate in a
criminal case undermines the fairness of the proceeding and
73
implicates protected expression.” The government’s asserted power
74
would therefore “undermin[e] the adversarial system of justice.”

65. Id. at 1335.
66. United States v. Luis, 564 F. App’x 493, 494 (11th Cir. 2014).
67. Id.
68. Id. (quoting Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 1345 (2012)).
69. See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 16, at 21 (“The Founding Fathers
so disdained in personam ‘forfeiture of estate’ penalties that they banned them in the
Constitution . . . .” (citation omitted)); see also Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416
U.S. 663, 682–86 (1974) (discussing the history of American forfeiture).
70. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 1–3, Luis v. United States, No. 14-419 (U.S. Apr. 16, 2015)
[hereinafter Reply Brief for Petitioner].
71. See id. at 3 (“But when this Court used the term ‘forfeitable’ in Monsanto and Caplin,
this Court was referring exclusively to tainted assets.”).
72. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 18, at 15.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 18.
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Implicit in this argument is a belief that public defenders cannot do
the same level of work as private counsel, especially concerning
75
complex federal charges. She argues that private attorneys ensure a
level of trust and confidence needed between an attorney and client
76
that is not as attainable by public defenders.
Luis then argues that the Court should fear what the government
might do with this new power, for it could possibly lead to
77
prosecutorial abuse. Luis describes that there must be some limit to
what the government is able to do with a defendant’s legitimate
78
funds. Although the Supreme Court has steadily increased
prosecutors’ forfeiture power, her case presents the opportunity to
79
establish some limit to that power. This limit would be that the
government cannot reach its hand into a defendant’s own personal
80
money and cripple her before her criminal trial has even begun.
Without this limit, Luis argues, the government has the ability to
81
impoverish any defendant by accusation alone.
She finally presents an equity argument: although the government
may have a speculative future interest in Luis’s substitute assets, these
interests are outweighed by a defendant’s interest in securing his or
82
her choice of counsel. She argues that the government’s desire for
future restitution in the event of conviction just cannot stand up to
“[a] criminal defendant’s present interest in her untainted assets for
75. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 16, at 10 (“[Pretrial restraint] takes from
[the defendant] the funds she would otherwise invest in her defense for the best and most
industrious investigators, experts, paralegals, and law clerks . . . .” (citation omitted)).
76. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 18, at 26–27.
77. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 16, at 15 (“There is the possibility that
prosecutors will seek broad, sweeping restraints recklessly or intentionally . . . .” (quoting
United States v. Bissell, 866 F.2d 1343, 1355 (11th Cir. 1989)); see also Kaley v. United States,
134 S. Ct. 1090, 1110 (2014) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“[F]ew things could do more to
undermine the criminal justice system’s integrity . . . than to allow the Government to . . . disarm
its presumptively innocent opponent by depriving him of his counsel of choice . . . .”).
78. Reply Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 70, at 13.
79. Id.
80. See Oral Argument at 36:03, Luis v. United States, No. 14-419 (U.S. Nov. 10, 2015),
https://apps.oyez.org/player/#/roberts6/oral_argument_audio/24016 (“And you might be right
that it just doesn’t make sense to draw a line here, but it leaves you with a situation in which
more and more and more we’re depriving people of the ability to hire counsel of choice in
complicated cases.”).
81. See id. at 28:29 (“[I]t’s pretty hard for me to think in a country which says before he’s
convicted, you have to release him on bail except in unusual circumstances, that nevertheless,
you can take all his money away so he can’t hire a lawyer.”).
82. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 18, at 30; see also id. at 14–15 (“The lower courts
improperly elevated the Government’s speculative interest in collecting a potential criminal
money judgment over Ms. Luis’s constitutional rights.”).
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83

the purpose of retaining counsel.” At the very least, she argues the
Court should be able to use its equitable powers to require that the
84
prosecution release only those funds necessary to hire an attorney.
B. The Government’s Arguments
The government bases its arguments on the reasons behind
forfeiture and a reading of Caplin and Monsanto which would
foreclose Luis’s arguments. According to the government, Monsanto
and Caplin were not decided as they were because the assets were
tainted (i.e., the proceeds from a crime) but rather because the assets
85
were forfeitable by statute. It is that they were forfeitable, and not
that they were tainted, that made them immune from Sixth
86
Amendment concerns. Similarly, Luis’s assets are not being seized
because they are tainted, but as substitute assets, which section 853
87
specifically condones. Read in this light, the Court has been
presented nothing in this case that Caplin and Monsanto have not
88
already decided. Additionally, the government, like the Eleventh
Circuit, reads the various circuit holdings to show that the courts that
have considered only the constitutional question (as opposed to
statutory interpretation) have all agreed that substitute assets are
89
restrainable.
The government next emphasizes the strong interests it has in
pursuing forfeiture. It insists that it must restrain assets, whether
substitute or not, to “preven[t] a continuing and substantial injury to
90
the United States.” Therefore, it is not Luis’s desire for counsel that

83. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 16, at 22.
84. Oral Argument, supra note 80, at 11:04 (Luis’s counsel arguing that at the very least
Luis is requesting the assets necessary to retain her counsel of choice); id. at 37:33 (Roberts,
C.J., questioning why the Government cannot at least release the small portion of assets for an
attorney).
85. Brief for the United States in Opposition, supra note 26, at 9–11.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 10–11.
88. See Brief for the United States, supra note 15, at 30 (“And the reasoning underlying
Monsanto’s approval of a pretrial freeze of assets determined likely to be forfeitable applies
fully to substitute assets.”).
89. See Brief for the United States in Opposition, supra note 26, at 14–16 (describing that
no case has recognized a constitutional right to use assets forfeitable by statute to hire counsel);
see also discussion supra Part III (explaining the Eleventh Circuit’s holding). But see supra note
52 and accompanying text (listing the courts that have held otherwise, based primarily on
statutory interpretation).
90. Brief for the United States in Opposition, supra note 26, at 4 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1345
(2012)).
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trumps the government’s interests, as Luis suggests, but rather the
91
strong governmental interests that trump Luis’s.
Lastly, the government cautions that deciding this case in Luis’s
favor would set a troubling precedent. It would signal to savvy
defendants that they could escape from asset forfeiture by quickly
disposing of their assets, thereby shielding themselves from forfeiture
92
and allowing them to hire any attorney that they desire. This
specifically, the government alleges, is why courts must allow restraint
of substitute assets: it ensures that the government can pursue
forfeiture regardless of whether a defendant has already spent his ill93
gotten gains. Otherwise, it would “give rise to absurd results, if a
defendant could dissipate her proceeds of crime, while retaining other
assets, and then immunize herself from a properly substantiated asset
94
freeze.”
V. ANALYSIS
The Court should hold for the government and rule that substitute
assets may be restrained pretrial. Ruling for the government would be
in line with precedent, would respect the reasons behind forfeiture,
and would not be unduly influenced by the hypothetical effects that
Luis claims such a ruling would have.
A. The Bank Robber Hypothetical Expanded
As previously described, the Southern District of Florida in United
States v. Luis relied on an analogy of a bank robber who spends the
money that he has stolen and then asserts that he should be free to
95
use his other assets to attain his choice of counsel. The Southern
96
District asserted that this should not be allowed. Luis’s argument
cannot succeed against the loophole it would create. Criminal
defendants would be encouraged to conceal, transfer, or destroy their
tainted assets as swiftly as possible and thereby circumvent possible

91. See id. at 8–9 (summarizing past holdings to make this point).
92. See id. at 11–12 (“But if petitioner’s position were adopted, then a defendant could
effectively deprive her victims of any opportunity for compensation simply by dissipating her illgotten gains.”).
93. See id. (“It is precisely to avoid that result that Congress provided for the pretrial
restraint of substitute assets in cases like this one . . . .”).
94. Brief for the United States, supra note 15, at 15.
95. See supra notes 62–65 and accompanying text.
96. See supra text accompanying note 64.
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97

future forfeiture. Congress specifically granted forfeiture of
substitute assets, and in order for it to have any real effect, it must
98
necessarily include pretrial restraint.
Part of the rationale of criminal forfeiture is to punish a defendant
99
by depriving him of his ill-gotten gains. Ruling in favor of Luis would
ignore and prevent this goal. Instead, it would allow Luis to “wiel[d]
undeserved economic power” by profiting both from her crime and
100
from her decision to transfer those ill-gotten gains.
B. The Right to Choice of Counsel is Not Absolute
The Court should also consider that the Sixth Amendment right to
choice of counsel is limited: a defendant cannot insist on counsel that
101
he or she cannot afford. Even Luis and various supporting amici
102
acknowledge this. As Monsanto and Caplin have held, the Sixth
Amendment does not include the right to spend another’s money to
retain an attorney, even when doing so is the only available means of
103
retaining that attorney.
This ruling establishes that when a
defendant’s assets are subject to pretrial restraint, his or her right to
choice of counsel is not infringed. The government’s position in Luis
is an extension of this rationale. Forfeiture is premised upon the
understanding that defendants facing forfeiture do not truly own the
money they wish to use, for that money is rightfully the government’s
104
from the moment the crime occurs. Luis, then, is no different from

97. See United States v. McHan, 345 F.3d 262, 272 (4th Cir. 2003) (“To conclude otherwise
would invite defendants who anticipate conviction for their unlawful drug-trafficking activities
to undertake the obvious step of transferring their assets . . . thereby circumventing the
important economic impact of forfeiture”); see also King, supra note 3, at 272–74 (making the
same argument).
98. See King, supra note 3, at 267 (“[T]he courts that have allowed pretrial restraint on
substitute assets . . . have reasoned that the prior restraint must be construed broadly if their
true purpose is to be fulfilled.”).
99. See Brief for the United States, supra note 15, at 36–38.
100. Id. at 36 (quoting Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 630
(1989)).
101. See supra text accompanying note 33. But see United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548
U.S. 140, 147–48 (2006) (recognizing the right to select counsel of one’s choice as “the root
meaning of the constitutional guarantee”).
102. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Associations of Criminal Defense Attorneys in Support
of Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8–9, Luis v. United States, No. 14-419 (U.S. Nov. 28, 2014)
[hereinafter Brief of Amici Curiae Associations of Criminal Defense Attorneys] (recognizing a
client may not choose an attorney who is not a member of the bar, an attorney who declines
representation, or an attorney with a conflict of interest).
103. See supra Part II for explanation.
104. United States v. Bissell, 866 F.2d 1343, 1351 (11th Cir. 1989).
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any other indigent defendant who must be appointed counsel—no
right has been taken away.
Luis’s argument next turns to what would happen should she be
left without choice of counsel: she would be forced to take a public
105
defender. Luis and amici assert that this would be unfair because
106
public defenders are overworked and have limited resources. This
argument fails to acknowledge that federal public defenders, who
would be appointed to this case, are known for much better
representation and better funding than the local public defenders who
107
are often the subject of public ridicule. Additionally, should Luis
instead be represented by a court-appointed private attorney, this
108
attorney would be paid at $125 an hour. Furthermore, Luis’s
arguments that private attorneys would undoubtedly do a better job
109
than court-appointed alternatives is unsupported by the evidence.
And regardless, as long as Luis has been appointed competent
110
counsel, then no Sixth Amendment right has been deprived.
C. Potential for Abuse is Not Enough
Luis’s next argument, that prosecutors will exercise this new
111
power in unjust ways, also does not provide enough to warrant a
ruling in her favor. Amici argue that “funding law enforcement
through forfeiture creates perverse and dangerous governmental
112
incentives at the local, state, and federal level,” and that this power
may be used as a “questionable litigation tactic meant . . . to pressure
113
[defendants] into a plea-bargain.”
105. See supra note 75 and accompanying text for more on this argument.
106. See, e.g., Brief of New York Council of Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae in Support
of Petitioner at 10–11, Luis v. United States, No. 14-419 (U.S. Aug. 25, 2015) (discussing limited
resources of public defenders); Brief Amicus Curiae of United States Justice Foundation, supra
note 7, at 22–23 (same).
107. See David Rudovsky, Gideon and the Effective Assistance of Counsel: The Rhetoric and
the Reality, 32 LAW & INEQ. 371, 376 (2014) (asserting that federal public defenders provide a
“good model” for local public defenders because they “have generally been at a level sufficient
to support high quality representation of indigent defendants in federal criminal cases.”).
108. Id. at 381.
109. See Brief for the United States, supra note 15, at 40–41 and citations within (presenting
evidence that court-appointed lawyers perform just as well as private counsel).
110. United States v. Bissell, 866 F.2d 1343, 1351 (11th Cir. 1989).
111. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Associations of Criminal Defense Attorneys, supra
note 102, at 12–13 (discussing possible prosecutorial behavior with this change).
112. Brief of Amici Curiae National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, et. al. at 4–
5, Luis v. United States, No. 14-419 (U.S. Aug. 25, 2015).
113. Brief of Amici Curiae Cato Institute and the DKT Liberty Project in Support of
Petitioner at 35, Luis v. United States, No. 14-419, (U.S. Aug. 25, 2015).
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There are two reasons to discount this argument. First, there are
already many tools in a prosecutor’s arsenal that could potentially be
114
used in an abusive manner. But “[t]he fact that [an] . . . [a]ct might
operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of
115
circumstances is insufficient to render it . . . invalid.” As stated in
Caplin, the federal forfeiture statutes are not made unconstitutional
“merely because in some cases prosecutors may abuse the processes
116
available to them.” Instead, trial courts can deal with specific
117
allegations of abuse and misconduct on a case-by-case basis.
Consequently, everything Luis asserts here has already been
determined against her.
Second, the Department of Justice specifically recognizes the
possibility for abuse in asset forfeiture and has written guidelines to
118
counteract it. For instance, seeking forfeiture requires approval
from Department of Justice headquarters, and Department of Justice
guidelines list various aspects to consider in determining when to
119
exempt assets from forfeiture. These guidelines admittedly cannot
resolve every concern, but they “substantially reduce the number of
potential ethical issues that inject ambiguities into the attorney’s role
120
as advocate.” They should therefore be considered “checks on the
121
exercise of prosecutorial discretion” and should calm the fears that
Luis asserts.
Prosecutors wield power in the criminal justice system, but they
also acknowledge this power and take steps to govern it. The Court
should not use the mere potential for abuse of this power as a reason
to hold for Luis.

114. Bissell, 866 F.2d at 1354–55.
115. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987).
116. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 618 (1989); see also
United States v. Nichols, 841 F.2d 1485, 1508 (10th Cir. 1988) (“We do not agree, however, that
the possibility of abuse renders the criminal forfeiture statute unconstitutional . . . . We do not
assume that the government will abuse its discretion.”).
117. Caplin, 491 U.S. at 635.
118. Nichols, 841 F.2d at 1508, n.14; see generally Asset Forfeiture Policy Manual, 2013,
DEP’T
OF
JUSTICE,
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminalU.S.
afmls/legacy/2014/05/23/policy-manual-2013rev.pdf (describing the Department of Justice’s asset
forfeiture policies).
119. Welling, supra note 2, at 600.
120. Kathleen F. Brickley, Forfeiture of Attorneys’ Fees: The Impact of RICO and CCE
Forfeitures on the Right to Counsel, 72 VA. L. REV. 493, 541–42 (1986).
121. Id.
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D. A Reweighing of Interests
The Court must also consider the policy arguments underlying
asset forfeiture. Holding for Luis would allow defendants to profit off
of their crimes, but allowing the government to restrain substitute
assets would be consistent with Congress’s goals in creating asset
122
forfeiture laws. The government has a legitimate pecuniary interest
in forfeiture “that extends to recovering all forfeitable assets, for such
assets are deposited in a Fund that supports law-enforcement efforts
123
in a variety of important and useful ways.” The Court should
consider why the United States pursues forfeiture at all: to deter
124
crime and return property to its rightful owners.
Luis argues that these governmental interests are future and
125
speculative, and not comparable to her current interest in securing
126
an attorney. Therefore, she states that a balancing of interests should
127
favor judgment in her favor. This argument incorrectly values the
interests at play. A ruling for the government would not abandon
Luis’s interest in counsel, but only alter it to require that she retain
appointed counsel. In the eyes of the law, she will still receive a
competent attorney and a fair trial. Conversely, allowing Luis to use
her assets would entirely destroy the government’s interests. The
government will not be able to compensate any victims (the assets
will have already been depleted), use the assets to improve
communities, provide for police training, deter crime, nor send a
message that crime does not pay. Even a limited release of the funds
needed to pay for counsel would necessarily lessen the compensation
of victims, and the Government may reasonably fear that a defendant
would blow through assets unnecessarily solely to keep it out of the
government’s hands. At the very least, Luis would become a message
that crime pays. It pays by providing the best criminal attorney

122. King, supra note 3, at 271–72.
123. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 629 (1989).
124. See Kaley v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1090, 1094 (2014) (“The Government also uses
forfeited property to recompense victims of crime, improve conditions in crime-damaged
communities, and support law enforcement activities like police training.”); United States v.
Schmitz, 153 F.R.D. 136, 140–41 (E.D. Wis. 1994) (discussing the rationale behind pretrial
restraint of substitute assets.); see also supra note 6 and accompanying text for more rationale
behind forfeiture.
125. See Brief of Amici Curiae Associations of Criminal Defense, supra note 102, at 16.
126. See id. at 17.
127. See supra notes 82–83 and accompanying text.
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available. A proper weighing of interests, therefore, favors upholding
the government’s ability to restrain Luis’s assets.
CONCLUSION
The issues presented in Luis v. United States serve as a useful
springboard for considering the pros and cons of asset forfeiture and
how the practice affects criminal defendants. Although Luis presents
strong arguments on bounds of governmental power and the rights to
which a defendant should be entitled, the Court cannot alter what has
already been established: a defendant does not have an unlimited
128
opportunity to use personal funds for his choice of counsel. Instead,
129
the result Luis desires would require legislative change.
Luis and certain amici rely largely on a frightening vision of what
the criminal justice system would turn into should prosecutors be able
130
to restrain substitute assets. But the Court should not be swayed by
this speculative dystopian prediction. It should instead focus its
analysis on the reasons for asset forfeiture, on preventing Luis from
profiting off of her crime, on the Department of Justice’s existing
policies to reduce potential abuse, and, most importantly, on the
limitations on the right to counsel—a right which would be
adequately preserved by appointed counsel. Therefore, the Court
should affirm the Eleventh Circuit and allow the federal government
to restrain Luis’s substitute assets.

128. Kathleen F. Brickley, Attorneys’ Fee Forfeitures: On Defining “What” and “When” and
Distinguishing “Ought” from “Is,” 36 EMORY L.J. 761, 778–79 (1987).
129. See Brief for the United States, supra note 15, at 41 (“If Congress believed that a
defendant like petitioner should always have access to some or all of the property in her hands
to pay for an attorney of her choice, it could change the law.”); see also Todd Barnet & Ivan
Fox, Trampling On the Sixth Amendment: The Continued Threat of Attorney Fee Forfeiture, 22
OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1, 80 (1995) (making the same argument).
130. See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of United States Justice Foundation, supra note 3, at 17.

